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brine-ed25519

license crates.io

A fast, low-overhead, Ed25519 signature verification library for the Solana SVM.

⚡ Performance

Operation Feature flag CU (Approx.) Notes
verify default ~3,824 challenge hash via sol_sha512 syscall
verify fast-sha512 ~11,350 in-program SHA-512, works on any cluster
verify_strict default ~3,877 challenge hash via sol_sha512 syscall
verify_strict fast-sha512 ~11,393 in-program SHA-512, works on any cluster

These values are measured inside the Solana SVM via test-program/, using the same direct-constant method as earlier releases with the 11-byte message hello world. CU usage depends on the message size. Almost the entire difference is the cost of hashing H(R || A || M) in-program versus one vectored syscall (85 CU base + ~max(10, len/2) CU per slice).

Strict point validation accounts for about 50 CU.


Features

  • Verifies Ed25519 signatures within the program, at run-time
  • Fully supports dynamically generated messages
  • No extra lamports required

Signature verification roughly follows RFC 8032


Quick Start

use brine_ed25519::*;

let pubkey: [u8; 32] = [...];
let sig: [u8; 64] = [...];

// Single message
verify(&pubkey, &sig, &[b"hello world"])?;

// Vectored message
verify(&pubkey, &sig, &[b"hello", b" ", b"world"])?;

// Prehashed challenge (precomputed H(R || A || M))
verify_prehashed(&pubkey, &sig, &challenge)?;

Custom hash implementations are supported via the Hasher trait and verify_with_hasher::<H>.

Each function also has a strict variation: verify_strict, verify_with_hasher_strict, and verify_prehashed_strict. These add small-order rejection matching Solana's ed25519 precompile. See Point validation for the tradeoff.

For clusters or SVM runtimes where the sol_sha512 syscall is not available, opt into in-program hashing (enabling this anywhere in the dependency tree opts the whole program out of the syscall):

brine-ed25519 = { version = "0.10", features = ["fast-sha512"] }

Syscall linkage follows the toolchain: dynamic on the default arch, static syscall numbers under cargo build-sbf --arch v3 (SBPF v3).


Cluster compatibility

Warning

This crate uses the sol_sha512 syscall by default. The syscall is gated by enable_sha512_syscall (s512oDwgx8hjMnaQjXfqqrZroVj4HvC6TkN3iSSWXCh), currently active on devnet and testnet, but not yet on mainnet-beta. A program built with the syscall path will fail to deploy/load on any cluster where the gate is inactive (unresolved sol_sha512 symbol at ELF verification). For mainnet today, enable the fast-sha512 feature.


But why?

Q: Why not use the native Ed25519 program?

A: Solana does provide a Ed25519 pre-compile program for signature verification, but it comes with several downsides:

  • Charges an extra 5000 lamports per signature
  • Consumes additional transaction data
  • Requires the instruction_sysvar to be passed into your program
  • Only verifies signatures on data hardcoded into the transaction
  • Cannot be used with dynamically generated data inside your program
  • Has cumbersome devex

This crate, brine-ed25519, solves all of that.


Security

Point validation

All verification functions enforce RFC 8032 point-encoding rules: the encoded y coordinate must be less than p = 2^255 - 19, and x = 0 cannot carry a set sign bit. Point decompression and on-curve validation are performed by the curve implementation.

verify_strict additionally matches Solana's ed25519 precompile by rejecting the eight canonical small-order public keys and R values. The non-strict functions use the cofactorless verification equation permitted by RFC 8032 and save about 50 CU by omitting this additional policy check.

Note, verify_strict hardens downstream code that treats a signature as unique, or checks only that a valid signature exists without binding it to the expected signer. Neither is a safe design: a signer can vary the nonce to produce different valid signatures, and verification must always identify the intended public key.

If your protocol relies on either assumption, verify_strict is not the fix! Your architecture is already unsafe. Strict verification only closes the small-order edge case.

Audits and review

The implementation was pulled from code-vm (MIT-licensed), which was written and maintained by the author of this crate.

Big thanks to all reviewers for helpful suggestions and CU reductions!

Note

This crate has had multiple rounds of optimizations since the audits above. If you prefer the to use the audited version, use v0.2.0 or lower, but note that the CU is more than double.


Contributing

Contributions are welcome! Please open issues or PRs on the GitHub repo.

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